China, India and the future of the global economy by Kwasnicki, Witold
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
China, India and the future of the global
economy
Witold Kwasnicki
Institute of Economic Sciences, University of Wroclaw, Poland
25. July 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/32558/
MPRA Paper No. 32558, posted 3. August 2011 21:43 UTC
1 
 
 
 
China, India and the future of the global economy 
 
Witold Kwasnicki 
Institute of Economic Sciences, University of Wroclaw 
ul. Uniwersytecka 22/26, 50-145 Wroclaw 
e-mail: kwasnicki@prawo.uni.wroc.pl 
http://www.prawo.uni.wroc.pl/~kwasnicki 
 
Globalization is commonly noted process and probably this is a main reason that there is 
growing interest on the future of global development. In the first part of the paper an overview 
of the long-term global economic growth forecasts is presented (e.g., forecasts of Uri Dadush 
and Bennett Stancil of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a report by HSBC, 
CitiGroup report, reports of PricewaterhouseCoopers, or Goldman Sachs reports). In this 
context, the diversified views and opinions on future economic development of China and 
India (currently considered as the fastest-growing major economies in the world) are 
presented. A common feature of almost all studies on long-term economic future of the world 
is that the authors conclude that China and India will dominate the global economy and in the 
middle of the twenty-first century they will be one of the largest economies in the world. To 
what extent this belief is justified is a subject of discussion in the second part of the article, 
where we present extrapolative forecast of global GDP and an estimation of the economies of 
China and India in global production by 2050 based on the so-called evolutionary model of 
competition. 
The evolutionary model of competition enables to estimate the competitiveness of national 
economies, therefore in the second part of the paper we presents the results of estimation of 
the competitiveness of the economies of India and China after World War II. One aim of that 
research is to compare the competitiveness of China and India with the leaders of economic 
development in the twentieth century, namely the United States, Great Britain, Germany, 
Japan and the European Union. The summary of these considerations are estimations the 
shares of GDP of China and India in the global product based on global scenarios of the 
competitiveness changes of these economies over the next 40 years. 
 
An overview of the global forecasts 
A kind of „reference year‟ of future studies is 2050. Numerous conferences and great 
number of publications are undertaken with the general theme „The World in 2050‟. One of 
the latest big, worldwide conference in that mood was that held in Berkeley, 23-24
th
 of 
January 2009, The World in 2050: A Scientific Investigation of the Impact of Global 
Population Changes on a Divided Planet.
1
 To give as an example of latest book on that 
subject, let‟s mention the important one, namely Laurence C. Smith, THE WORLD IN 2050: 
Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future.
2
 The four global forces which will shape 
the future of the next 40 years are (in opinion of L.C. Smith) are following: (1) population 
demographics, (2) resource demand, (3) globalization, and (4) climate change. In the first part 
of the book Smith identifies key world pressures and trends (among others urbanization, 
                                                 
1
 http://bixby.berkeley.edu/research/population/world-in-2050/presentations/ 
http://www.prb.org/Journalists/Webcasts/worldin2050/worldin2050-overview.aspx 
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 Laurence C. Smith, THE WORLD IN 2050: Four Forces Shaping Civilization's Northern Future [Dutton / 
Penguin USA, published by Dutton in September 2010 [UK edition titled THE NEW NORTH: The World in 
2050, Profile Books 2011]. 
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population aging, energy technology, water supply, immigration, and a historic transfer of 
wealth and power from west to east). In the next part he describes the emergence of a new 
region, so called "Northern Rim" (NORCs), which consists of eight northern countries: the 
northern United States, Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and 
the Russian Federation. In the final part Smith “explores some more extreme, but less likely 
potential outcomes; and the power of societal choice in shaping our future”. 
Numerous institutions undertake almost systematic future studies on global development. 
Some of them will be outlined later in that section of the paper, but as a kind of the summery 
let‟s present a list of that publications.  
 
Goldman Sachs, one of the biggest investment banking and securities firm, started to 
publish future study reports since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, among them are: 
 Building Better Global Economic BRICs, Jim O‟Neill, 30th November 2001, Global 
Economics, Paper No: 66 
 Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050, 1st October 2003 
 BRICs and Beyond, Tushar Poddar and Eva Yi, January 22, 2007 
 Ten Things for India to Achieve its 2050 Potential, June 16, 2008 
 The Long-Term Outlook for the BRICs and N-11 Post Crisis, December 4, 2009 
 
In fact it was Jim O‟Neill, who in his 2001 report coined the acronym BRICs, to refer to 
the four countries, namely Brazil, Russia, India and China. The acronym is now commonly 
used as a symbol of the shift in global economic power towards the developing world, away 
from currently the most developed G7 economies. 
The other global institution systematically publishing the reports on future development is 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the world's second-largest professional services firm and one 
of the „Big Four‟ audit and accountancy firms. We will refer to its four reports, namely  
 The World in 2050. How big will the major emerging market economies get and how 
can the OECD compete?, John Hawksworth, March 2006  
 The World 2050, Beyond the BRICs: a broader look at emerging market growth 
prospects, John Hawksworth and Gordon Cookson, Match 2008. 
  The World in 2050. The accelerating shift of global economic power: challenges and 
opportunities, John Hawksworth and Anmol Tiwari, January 2011. 
 
Other reports included in the review: 
 Sandra Poncet (2006), The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World Economy: 
Horizon 2050 
 Uri Dadush, Bennett Stancil, The World order in 2050, 2010, the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 
 Karen Ward, The World in 2050, January 2011, HSBC Global Banking and Markets 
 Willem Buiter Ebrahim Rahbari, Global growth generators: Moving beyond emerging 
markets and BRICs, 21 February 2011; Citi Investment Research & Analysis, a 
division of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 
 
Goldman Sachs future reports 
The 2003 report on Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050 focuses on the comparison of 
development of the four BRICs countries and G6, currently the most advanced economies 
(US, Japan, UK, Germany, France and Italy).
3
 As we see in Figure 1, according to that report, 
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 As the authors of the report comment: “In focusing on the G6 (rather than the G7 or a broader grouping), we 
decided to limit our focus to those developed economies with GDP currently over US$1 trillion. This means that 
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in 2025 the BRICs countries reach the 50% level o GDP of G6, and around 2040 their GDP 
will be greater than the total GDP of G6. 
 
 
Figure 1. Projection of GDP(in 2003 US$bn) of BRICs and G6 countries (after Goldman 
Sachs, 2003) 
 
This rapid growth will be mainly due to high development of China and India. As it is seen 
in Figure 2, according to the prediction of Goldman Sachs made in 2003, Chinese economy 
will be the largest in the world in 2050, followed by currently the biggest US economy, but on 
the third place will be India. Economies of Brazil and Russia (respectively on the 5
th
 and 6
th
 
positions in 20050 ranking) will be much smaller, although larger than the economies of UK, 
Germany, France and Italy.  
 
 
Figure 2. The largest economies in 2050 (in 2003 US$bn); (after Goldman Sachs, 2003) 
 
The projection of development of the five biggest economies, as envisaged by Goldman 
Sachs (2003) is presented in Figure 3. According to that prediction Chinese economy will be 
greater than that of US around 2040, but what is really interesting that India will experience 
impressive economic growth in the next decades and will be very close behind the China and 
                                                                                                                                                        
Canada and some of the other larger developed economies are not included. Adding these economies to the 
analysis would not materially change the conclusions.” 
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US in the middle of the 21
st
 century; around 2033 the Indian economy will overcome the 
Japanese one. This process is nicely illustrated by the diagrams in Figure 4. It is clearly seen 
that the enormous economic growth of China and India is accompanied by rapid demographic 
process. The population of China will growth from 1316 million in 2005 to 1418 million in 
2050, but at the same period the population of India will growth much faster, namely from 
1087 million to 1601 million. Therefore in spite of very rapid economic growth, India will not 
catch up the Western societies in terms of economic welfare, although the growth of GDP per 
capita will be quite large, more than 5 times greater in 2050 compared to that in 2005. In 2005 
the GDP per capita in India was equal to 3344 US$ and in 2050 will be 17366 UD$, still more 
than twice smaller the current GDP per capita in US. In the period 2005-2050 the GDP per 
capita in China will growth from 7204 US$ do 31357 US$ (i.e., more than four times) while 
US per capita only double (from 41399 to 83710 US$). So we see that in spite of very high 
economic growth of China and India the welfare of the Western societies will be still much 
higher than in China and India. The Western Europe will experience stagnation in terms of 
demographic process in the first half of the 21
st
 century (in fact slight decline of population 
from 397 million in 2005 to 391 million in 2050, while at the same time US population will 
growth from 297 million to 420 million) and much slower growth in terms of economic 
welfare (GDP per capita will growth form 29227US$ in 2005 to 49154 US$ in 2050, i.e. less 
than double).  
  
 
 
Figure 3. Projection of GDP growth (in 2003 US$bn) of five largest economis (after Goldman 
Sachs, 2003) 
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Figure 4. Illustration of economic and demographic growth of six countries/regions up to 
2050 (after Goldman Sachs, 2003) 
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Important note 
It is important to note that in all presented and outlined reports on future development the 
neoclassical model based on the simple Cobb-Douglas function is applied. The predictions 
highly depends on subjective assumptions made by the researchers. Let‟s motion the model 
presented in the Goldman Sachs report published in 2003, but all other reports and forecast 
are using more or less similar approach.  
It is assumed that GDP growth (Y) is described by a simple (Cobb-Douglas) function of 
three ingredients, namely labour (L), the capital stock (K) and the level of “technical 
progress” (A) or Total Factor Productivity (TFP):  
 
          
 
To predict growth of GDP it is necessary to make predictions concerning growth in 
employment, growth in the capital stock and technical progress (or total-factor productivity 
(TFP) growth). For, L, the projections of the working age population (15-60) from the US 
Census Bureau is used. On the basis of the initial capital stock and assumed an investment 
rate (investment as a share of GDP) together with assumed depreciation rate () the capital 
stock is calculated as: 
       (   )  (
  
  
)     
For A, the description of technical progress, it is assumed “that technology changes as part 
of a process of catch-up with the most developed countries. The speed of convergence is 
assumed to depend on income per capita, with the assumption that as the developing 
economies get closer to the income levels of the more developed economies, their TFP growth 
rate slows.” To calculate A the following formula is applied: 
  
    
          (
                 
                 
) 
where  is a measure of how fast convergence takes place and 1.3% is the assumed long-term 
TFP growth rate for the US. 
As the authors of the 2003 report write: “Depreciation rate () assumed to be 4% as in the 
World Bank capital stock estimates. Investment rate assumptions based on recent history, for 
Brazil (19%), for India (22%) for Russia (25%) for China (36% until 2010, declining to 30% 
thereafter). Income share of capital assumed to be 1/3, a standard assumption () from 
historical evidence. US long-run TFP growth assumed to be 1.33%, implying steady-state 
labour productivity growth of 2%- our long-run estimate. Convergence speed for TFP () 
assumed to be 1.5%, within the range of estimates from academic research.”  
So we see that large number of assumptions are quite arbitrary, therefore it is not surprise 
that sometime large differences in the forecasts are observed. For example the Goldman Sachs 
report published four years later (in 2007) contains esentially different projection (see Figure 
5). China in 2050 is almost twice ahead of US, and US and India economies are comparable 
in 2050. Also Japan is far behind Brazil, Mexico, And Russia.  
7 
 
 
Figure 5. GDP projection for the largest economies (in 2006 $US bn); after Goldman Sachs, 
2007. BRICs and Beyond, Tushar Poddar and Eva Yi, January 22, 2007 
 
PricewaterhouseCoopers reports 
John Hawksworth and Gordon Cookson in the 2008 report The World 2050, Beyond the 
BRICs: a broader look at emerging market growth prospects update the former 2006 report of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. The main conclusions of that report is that by 2050, the E7 
emerging economies (i.e., the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, plus 
Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey) will be around 50% larger than the current G7 (US, Japan, 
Germany, UK, France, Italy and Canada); China is expected to overtake the US as the largest 
economy around 2025 and “India has the potential to nearly catch up with the US by 2050”. 
New countries enter the club of the fastest growing economies, namely the fastest growing 
economies in 2050 will be “headed by Vietnam, and the top 10 includes Nigeria, Philippines, 
Egypt and Bangladesh”. The projected by the 2008 report relative size of the four largest 
economies are presented in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6. The projected relative size of the four major economies (PwC, 2008) 
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It is worth to note large differences in the projections made by the same authors in 2006 
and 2008 PwC reports. These differences are summarized in Table 1. Let‟s note that even the 
estimates of 2005 GDP for China and India are significantly different.  
 
Table 1. Key changes in results in 2006 and 2008 reports of PwC - relative size of Chinese 
and Indian economies compared to the US 
 
The main explanation for such big differences given by the authors are following: “Our 
projections for long-term average growth in the individual advanced economies have changed 
by no more than 0.1-0.2 percentage points per annum on average over the period to 2050, 
which is well within the margin of error for such long-term estimates. Projected growth rates 
in Brazil, Mexico, Russia and Turkey have similarly changed little since our original March 
2006 report. Projected real GDP growth in Indonesia has been revised down slightly, but this 
country still ranks third in our E7 growth league table and so remains a relatively strong 
performer. Our projections for China and India have, however, changed more materially ... 
There are two main reasons for these changes. First, major new research led by the World 
Bank, which was published in December 2007, has for the first time produced official PPP 
estimates for China and has significantly revised earlier estimates for India. In both cases, the 
result is to raise estimates of relative price levels in these emerging economies and therefore 
to reduce significantly the estimated relative size of the Chinese and Indian economies in PPP 
terms (i.e. in terms of the volume rather than the value of goods and services produced). Thus 
… China‟s economy in 2005 was only around half the size of the US based on these new PPP 
estimates, compared to a previous estimate of around three-quarters, while India‟s economy is 
now estimated at 22% of the size of the US in that year as compared to an earlier estimate of 
around 30%. Estimates of the relative value of the output of these economies at market 
exchange rates are not affected by these changes, so the initial gap between MER [Market 
Exchange Rate] and PPP estimates of GDP accordingly shrinks. Second, however, and 
offsetting this effect in terms of our long-term PPP projections, the Chinese and Indian 
economies have grown much more strongly over the past two years than our model estimates 
were originally suggesting and all the indications are that this more rapid rate of „catch up‟ 
will be sustained for at least the next few years. The Chinese investment rate has also been 
significantly higher in 2006-7 than assumed in our original report and, although this is still 
expected to slow over time, this may not happen as fast as was originally assumed. Taking 
these more recent data (and other independent forecasts of Chinese and Indian growth) into 
account has caused us to revised up significantly our projections for the sustainable growth 
rate of these economies over the next 10 years, although these effects then fade away in later 
years (and indeed will be reversed eventually as catch up occurs earlier so the scope for 
further catch up is reduced in the long run). Furthermore, faster relative productivity growth 
also translates into faster expected real exchange rate appreciation over the next 15-20 years. 
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This further boosts projected real growth in the Chinese and Indian economies in dollar terms, 
although it does not affect projected real growth in domestic currency or PPP terms.”  
So we see how cautiously it is necessary to read the published projections, when even 
seemingly hard historical data on current GDP are not reliable.  
 
Other reports 
There are numerous publication under the general theme „How the World will look like in the 
2050”. Here we will shortly present only four of them. In the chronological order, let‟s start 
form the Sandra Poncet (2006) study on „The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World 
Economy: Horizon 2050‟.4 Sandra Poncet develops long-term forecasts for world economic 
growth, based on a simple production function, therefore it is assumed that an economy can 
grow by (1) deploying more inputs (i.e., labour and capital) to production and/or by (2) 
becoming more efficient, i.e. producing more output per unit of input. Similar as it was 
applied in the mentioned Goldman Sachs model, the analysis of past performance is carried 
out to describe the process by which physical capital accumulates over time and to estimate 
the parameters of a catch-up model of technology diffusion. Modification of real exchange 
rates against the US dollar is incorporated into the analysis. The main findings of the analysis 
are following: “in less than 50 years, China and India together could match the size of the US 
in current dollars (26.6 against 26.9% of the world GDP in 2050). China and India will stand 
out as an engine of new demand growth and spending, their GDP will grow at yearly average 
rate of 4.6 and 4.5%, respectively between 2005 and 2050. The largest economies in the world 
(by GDP) may no longer be the richest (in terms of income per capita).” In the conclusion 
Poncet states that “China‟s GDP in 2050 could represent 22% of world GDP (at current US $ 
and current relative prices). Between 2005 and 2050, China and India could experience a 13-
fold and a 10-fold increase in GDP respectively at current real exchange rate. … We do not, 
however, expect the US to lose the first rank in the world GDP hierarchy over the next 50 
years. We anticipate that in 2050, China‟s GDP could reach $ 31 compared to $ 38 trillion for 
the US, moving Japan down from second position to the benefit of China. South Korea is 
predicted to improve its rank from 10th in 2005 to fourth in 2050. A similar progression is 
expected for India - projected to jump from 13th to fifth position. India could become larger 
than France in 2025 and larger than Germany in 2039. In 2050 India‟s GDP would, however, 
correspond only to 18% of the United States‟ GDP. Of the current G7 (the United States, 
Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada) only the US, Japan, 
Germany and the United Kingdom may be among the seven largest economies in 2050. 
China, South Korea and India are expected to overtake France, Italy and Canada before that 
date.” 
 
Celebrating its centennial anniversary, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
has published in April 2010 the report on „The World order in 2050‟.5 As in all former 
outlined reports, the authors envisage that “China remains on a path to overtake the United 
States as the world‟s largest economic power within a generation, and India will join both as a 
global leader by mid-century. Traditional Western powers will remain the wealthiest nations 
in terms of per capita income, but will be overtaken as the predominant world economies by 
much poorer countries. … Absolute poverty will be confined to small pockets in sub-Saharan 
Africa and India, though relative poverty will persist, and may even become more acute. 
Carbon emissions are also on a path toward climate catastrophe, and by mid-century may 
                                                 
4
 Sandra Poncet (2006), The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World Economy: Horizon 2050 
(http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/workpap/summaries/2006/wp06-16.htm) 
5
 Uri Dadush, Bennett Stancil, „The World order in 2050‟, 2010, 
 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/World_Order_in_2050.pdf 
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constitute a serious risk to the global growth forecast. International organizations such as the 
IMF will be compelled to reform their governance structures to become more representative 
of the new economic landscape. Those that fail to do so will become marginalized.” 
 
Global Research, a division of HSBC Global Banking and Markets, published in January 
2011 a report on „The World in 2050‟.6 Once again the simple production function model (so 
called the Barro‟s growth model) is applied in the report. The main findings of the model are 
more or less similar to the previously presented forecasts: in 2050 “19 of the 30 largest 
economies will be emerging economies; The emerging economies will collectively be bigger 
than the developed economies; Global growth will accelerate thanks to the contribution from 
the emerging economies; With the rapid growth of the emerging markets, the global economy 
is experiencing a seismic shift.” 
In particular they predict that an average annual world growth will equal to 3%, compared 
with growth of just over 2% in the 2000s. Emerging-world growth will contribute twice as 
much as the developed world to global growth over this period. By 2050, the emerging world 
will have increased five-fold and will be larger than the developed world. China and India 
will be the largest and third-largest economies in the world, respectively. Substantial progress 
up the global league table will be made by a host of other emerging economies – most 
notably, Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, Malaysia, Thailand, Colombia and Venezuela.  
HSBC predict that in 2050 China at $24.6 trillion (constant 2000 dollars) and the US at 
$22.3 trillion will together lead global economy. India at $8.2 trillion will be far behind on the 
third position. The report envisages an eightfold jump in the per capita income of China and 
India but still they will not come to close to matching US living standards (Americans will be 
still three times richer than the Chinese in 2050). 
 
It seems that like HBSC, Citygroup have been „jealous‟ of the future reports issued by 
Goldman Sachs and therefore also published its own report (in February 2011) on „Global 
growth generators: Moving beyond emerging markets and BRICs‟.7 They declare that they ” 
intend to systematically research the global generators of growth for the future”. What they 
expect about the future? It seems that City is very optimistic: they predict high growth of the 
World economy, with average real GDP growth rates of 4.6% until 2030 and 3.8% between 
2030 and 2050 (the world GDP will rise in real PPP-adjusted terms from 72 trillion USD in 
2010 to 380 trillion USD in 2050). Asia and Africa will be the fastest growing regions 
(Bangladesh, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Mongolia, Nigeria, Philippines, Sri Lanka 
and Vietnam have the most promising (per capita) growth prospects), and “China should 
overtake the US to become the largest economy in the world by 2020, then be overtaken by 
India by 2050”. But growth will not be smooth, as usual with booms and busts. 
“Occasionally, there will be growth disasters, driven by poor policy, conflicts, or natural 
disasters.” In the conclusion they declare that “There‟s never been a better time for 
humanity”. Astonishingly the prediction presented in the Citi report suggests that India will be 
the largest economy by 2050 (with the total GDP equal to 85.97 bn US$) followed by China 
(80.02 bn) and US on the third position (39.07 bn). It means that the Indian and Chinese 
economies will be more than twice larger than the US economy. Personally I do not believe in 
such great GDP gap between China or India and US in 2050. This senario seems to be rather 
improbably.  
                                                 
6
 Karen Ward „The World in 2050‟, January 2011, 
 http://www.research.hsbc.com/midas/Res/RDV?p=pdf&key=ej73gSSJVj&n=282364.PDF 
7
 Willem Buiter  Ebrahim Rahbari, „Global growth generators: Moving beyond emerging markets and BRICs‟, 
21 February 2011; Citi Investment Research & Analysis, a division of Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 
http://www.nber.org/~wbuiter/3G.pdf 
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Let‟s end this short review of selected prognosis by the forecast made by The Economist in 
the end of January 2011 (see Figure 7). We see that Lombard Street Research and Economist 
Intelligence Unit envisage almost stagnation of Japanese economy, and very fast growth of 
China, accompanied by moderate (normal) growth of US Economy. Around 2020 Chinese 
GDP will be higher than that of USA.  
 
 
Figure 7. GDP projection for three leading economies. Lombard Street Research and 
Economist Intelligence Unit; After: ‘Rising power, anxious state, The special report on 
China’, The Economist, 23.01.2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18829149 
 
Summary of the reports 
There is one common feature of all reviewed reports, namely that China, USA and India will 
be the biggest economies in the World by 2050 (beside Poncet report, placing India on the 5
th
 
position). This is summarized in the Table 2.  
The direct result of rapid economic growth of India and China is „the global economy‟s 
shifting centre of gravity‟, as it is called by Danny Quah.8 Quah makes relevant calculations 
taking into account all the GDP produced on this planet, and describes the dynamics of the 
global economy‟s centre of gravity, the average location of economic activity across 
geographies on the Earth. In in 1980 the global economy‟s centre of gravity was mid-Atlantic, 
but by 2008 the centre of gravity had drifted to a location east of Helsinki and Bucharest. By 
extrapolating growth in almost 700 locations across Earth, Quah projects the world‟s 
economic centre of gravity to locate by 2050 literally between India and China. This findings 
are presented in Figure 8. 
The growing importance of the two major Asian economies inspires some thinkers to 
consider China and India as „one big organism‟. Indian Member of Parliament, Jairam 
Ramesh coined in 2005 the common term for that „organism‟, namely Chindia. In his book 
Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India
9
 he argues that in spite of 
geopolitical, cultural, economic and political differences between China and India, it is 
justified to use common term Chindia, due to some complementarities between these two 
                                                 
8
 Danny Quah, The Global Economy‟s Shifting Centre of Gravity, Global Policy, Volume 2, Issue 1, pages 3–9, 
January 2011; http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00066.x/full 
9
 Jairam Ramesh, Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India, India Research Press, 2005. 
12 
 
countries (“China is perceived to be strong in manufacturing and infrastructure while India is 
perceived to be strong in services and information technology. China is stronger in hardware 
while India is stronger in software. China is stronger in physical markets while India is 
stronger in financial markets. The countries also share certain historical interactions - the 
spread of Buddhism from India to China and trade on the Silk route are famous examples”).  
Antagonist of that idea claim that the Sino-Indian War of 1962 makes the relations 
between the countries hard, cautious and slowly improving. They also underline political 
differences („China can be characterized as a single party authoritarian state whereas India is a 
democracy of hundreds of political parties‟) as well as different cultural backgrounds („India's 
culture can be characterized by a high degree of pluralism whereas China has a more 
ethnically homogeneous population.‟). 
 
Tabela 2. Ranking of the biggest economies in 2050 as proposed in different reports 
Report China USA India 4th position 5th position 
Goldman Sachs 2003 1 2 3 Japan Brazil 
Goldman Sachs 2007 1 2 2 Brazil Mexico 
Goldman Sachs 2008 1 3 2 Brazil Russia 
Goldman Sachs 2009 1 2 3 Brazil Russia 
PwC 2006 1 2 2 Brazil Japan 
PwC 2008 1 2 3 Brazil  Japan- 
Indonesia-
Mexico-
Russia  
PwC 2011 1 3 2 Brazil Japan -Russia 
Citigroup 2011 2 3 1 Indonesia Brazil 
HSBC 2011 1 2 3 Japan  Germany 
Sandra Poncet 2006 2 1 5 Japan the 3
rd
 
position 
 
Carnegie 2010 1 2 3 Japan Brazil 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The world’s economic centre of gravity, 1980–2007 (black) and extrapolated (in 
red), at three-year intervals. 
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Jairam Ramesh claims that the „rise‟ of these countries might be understood „less as a new 
development and more as a re-emergence‟. He points out that „at the beginning of the 
18
th
 century, China and India certainly dominated the world and not just demographically." 
Ramesh opinion seems to be justified on the basis of the historical process of distribution of 
world income. Agnus Maddison in his Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run
10
 
divided the world into five regions, namely China, India, Europe, the United States, Japan, 
and Russia and presented the shares of the World GDP at the years 1700, 1820, 1952, 1978, 
2003, and project it to 2030 (see Table 3). As we see China with 22,3% of the world income, 
and India with 24.4% in 1700 dominated the world global economy. Almost the same figures 
are in 1820 (total share of Chindia was 48.9%, compared to 46.7% in 1700). The Chindia 
share declined in the 19
th
 and the 20
th
 century to 8.2% in 1978 and since that year is steadily 
rising. In 2003 the share was equal to 20.6% and (as Maddison predicts) in 2030 it will equal 
to 33.5%.  
Table 3. Shares of World GDP, 1700-2003 (per cent of World Total) 
 
 
 
The on-going process of shifting the „centre of global economic activity‟ has spurred the 
initiative to establish The India China and America (ICA) Institute as a non-profit 
organization, “to foster economic growth through Innovation, Entrepreneurship and 
Inclusiveness within India, China and America (ICA) and Trade and Investment between 
these three economies.”11 It is claimed that “this is the new triad power (India, China and 
America) replacing the old triad power (Japan, Europe and USA). Unlike the old triad power, 
the new one is not likely to evolve as harmoniously because of the past ideologies of the 
countries involved (communist ideology of China, Socialist ideology of India and Capitalist 
ideology of America). Therefore, it needs an active catalyst like ICA Institute to create a 
harmonious relationship between business leaders, policy makers and the political processes 
to generate economic growth.”  
 
China, India and the rest of the world form different perspective 
In the middle of the 1990s we have proposed the evolutionary model of substitution-diffusion 
processes
12
 which can be used to investigate international competition of countries and 
regions. The model and the procedure of its parameters identification is presented in our paper  
published in TF&SCh, here we will confine ourselves to describe only the model‟s basic 
characteristics. 
                                                 
10
 Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. Second Edition, Revised and updated: 
960-2030 AD, OECD 2007, p. 103, Table 4.6. 
11
 http://www.icainstitute.org/ 
12
 W. Kwasnicki, H. Kwasnicka, „Long-Term Diffusion Factors of Technological Development: An 
Evolutionary Model and Case Study‟, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 52 (1996), 31-57. 
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Let‟s assume that we have n competing nations (or regions). The dynamics of the share fi(t) 
of a nation (region) i in the global GDP in year t can be described by so called replicator 
equation (or selection equation): 
  ( )    (   )
  
 ̅(   )
 
(1) 
 
where 
ci(t) – competitiveness of the nation (region) I at time t, 
 ̅( ) – the average competitiveness at time t: 
 ̅( )  ∑    ( )
 
   
 
(2) 
 
As we see from the replicator equation, the share of nation (region) i is growing if the 
competitiveness of that nation is greater than the average competitiveness and is declining for 
the competitiveness smaller than the average competiveness. 
Let‟s first assume that we divide the world into three regions, namely the Western 
countries, China, and the rest of the World
13
 and we identify the replicator equations 
parameters on the basis of historical data from years 1980 to 2006.
14
 We use the historical 
data available at The Conference Board Total Economy Database website.
15
 The data was 
downloaded on the 19
th
 of November 2009.
16
 Identified competiveness for three considered 
regions and the initial shares are presented in Table 4. We see that the China‟s 
competitiveness is much higher than the competitiveness of the West as well as of the Rest 
the World. The model fits quite well to the historical data (see Figure 9). According to our 
preliminary extrapolations, in 2050 the West and the Rest will have roughly the same shares 
in the global GDP (equal to 19%), and the share of China will be around 60%. China will 
surpass the West as well as the Rest around 2025. This scenario seems to be rather 
improbably and the discussion of reliability of those predictions will be presented in the 
following part of the paper.  
 
Table 4.Values of the model’s parameters: China, West and the Rest of the World – the 
identification period 1980-2006 
 Competitiveness (ci) Initial share fi(t0) in 1979 
West 0.999152 0.486100 
China 1.047807 0.053287 
Rest of the World 1.000000 0.460613 
 
                                                 
13
 the Western countries includes: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (West 
Germany from 1950-1988, united Germany from 1989-onwards), Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Canada, United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, the China consists of People‟s Republic of China and Hong Kong. 
14
 In 1977 Deng Xiaoping became the new leader of China (after Mao Zedong‟s death) and has initiated pro free 
market economic reforms (based also on the economic policy encouraging foreign trade and foreign 
investments). 
15
 http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/  
16
 The global GDP is expressed in constant purchasing power dollar terms in 1990, called Geary-Khamis 
PPPs. This methodology is widely accepted (including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), as 
was proposed in 1958 by Roy C. Geary and modified by Salem Hanna Khamis in the early 1970s.  
15 
 
 
Figure 9. Evolution of the GDP shares of the three regions: China, West and the Rest of the 
World (the identification period 1980-2006) 
 
We obtain slightly different results if we use the whole available historical date of the 
period 1950-2006 for the parameters‟ identification. The overall competitiveness of China is 
much lower (see Table 5) and in the middle of the 21
st
 century the share of the China in the 
global GDP is almost the same as the share of the West (roughly 29%; see Figure 10). The 
share of the Rest is equal to 42%. Naturally we may complain that the fitting of the model to 
historical data is not good (Figure 10). It is understandable because the structure of Chinese 
economy of the post-war period up to the end of the 1970s was significantly different than 
that of post 1980 one.  
We may expect that the competitiveness of those regions is far from being constant and 
fluctuates in the course of time. Our model allows identifying dynamics of those fluctuations. 
Namely we are able to assume much smaller identification period (e.g., 7 years window) and 
make the identification of the competitiveness starting from the period 1950-1956 and move 
the 7 years window up to the last year, that is to the period 2000-2006.
17
 In such a case we 
obtain a kind of a „moving competitiveness‟. The result of this experiment is presented in 
Figure 11.  
 
Table 5. Values of the model’s parameters: China, West and the Rest of the World – the 
identification period 1950-2006 
 Competitiveness (ci) Initial share fi(t0) in 1949 
West 0.992706 0.568897 
China 1.020249  0.035354 
Rest of the World 1.000000  0.395749 
 
 
                                                 
17
 this procedure is described in details in (Kwasnicki, Kwasnicka, 1996) 
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Figure 10. Evolution of the GDP shares of the three regions: China, West and the Rest of the 
World (the identification period 1950-2006) 
 
As it is seen (Figure 11) the competitiveness is far from being constant. Up to the end of 
the 1980s the competitiveness of the West was below the competitiveness of the Rest of the 
World and usually below China competitiveness. The West economies were more competitive 
since the end of 1980s, but after the dot.com crises in the turn of the centuries, the West 
competitiveness is declining. It is clearly seen that the China competitiveness started to rise 
after the Deng Xiaoping reforms and (although fluctuating) was much higher than the West 
and the Rest competiveness. It is hardly to predict the future of the Chinese economy 
competiveness but we may expect that in near future advance of China will sustain. Lesson of 
Japan may give us a hint what may happen in longer perspective.  
 
Figure 11. Dynamics of the competitiveness: China, West and the Rest of the World 
(identification is based on the 7 years moving window of historical data) 
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As it is known, Japan economy was treated as a pattern for growth in post-war period up to 
the beginning of the 1970s. Identified competitiveness of Japanese economy, based on the 
historical data from 1950 to 1970 is roughly similar as the China competitiveness for the 
period 1980-2006 (see Table 6) – the competitiveness was roughly 4% higher than the West 
and the Rest competitiveness. The share of Japan GDP in global production more than 
doubled in the period 1950-1970 (similar as it was in the period 1980-2000 for China).  
The prediction of the shares in global GDP of Japan and two other regions are shown in 
Figure 12. We see that since the middle of the 1970s the discrepancy between the prediction 
and the real development is growing. Prediction based on the trend observed in 1950-1980 
suggested that in 2030 the share of Japan economy will be above 50% (as in the case of China 
in 2050). According to that predictions we might expect that the share of Japan in the global 
production in 2006 ought to be 27%, in reality it declined to 6% (see Figure 12).  
 
Table 6. Values of the model’s parameters: Japan, West and the Rest of the World – the 
identification period 1950-1970 
 Competitiveness (ci) Initial share fi(t0) in 1949 
West 0.996064  0.569261 
Japan 1.043551  0.028382 
Rest of the World 1.000000  0.402356 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Evolution of the GDP shares of the three regions: Japan, West and the Rest of the 
World (the identification period 1950-1970) 
 
Those results suggest that it would be good to look at the dynamics of the Japan 
competitiveness. Results of similar experiment with moving 7 years identification window (as 
in the case of China) are presented in Figure 13. We see that the pattern of changes of Japan 
competitiveness in the 1950-1970 is more or less similar to the pattern of changes of the 
China competitiveness in 1980-2000 (compare Figures 13 and 11), we see enormous 
superiority of Japan and China economies in the relevant periods. As we can notice (Figure 
13) the sharp decline of the Japan competitiveness was observed in the 1970s, almost constant 
level of the competitiveness in the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, and once more sharp 
decline in the turn of the 20
th
 and the 21
st
 centuries. We do not claim that the similar pattern 
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will be observed in the case of the China economy in the next few decades, but we would like 
to point that we ought to be very cautious in our evaluations of future of Chinese economy. 
 
Figure 13. Dynamics of the competitiveness: Japan, West and the Rest of the World 
(identification is based on the 7 years moving window of historical data) 
Table 7. Values of the model’s parameters: USA, E12, Japan, China, India and the Rest of 
the World – the identification period 1950-2006 
 Competitiveness (ci) Initial share fi(t0) in 1949 
USA  0.995710  0.253936 
E12  0.992412  0.261623 
Japan  1.014378  0.041473 
China  1.022661  0.035302 
India  1.006745  0.032042 
Rest of the World 1.000000  0.375624 
 
  
Figure 14. Evolution of the GDP shares of the six regions/countries: USA, E12, Japan, 
China, India and the Rest of the World (the identification period 1950-2006) 
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Our model allows to investigate the evolution of larger number of countries/regions. As the 
first experiment in that series, let us assume that the world is divided into six 
countries/regions, namely: USA, E12
18
, Japan, China, India and the Rest of the World. The 
overall competitiveness of those six countries/regions in the post-war period is presented in 
Table 7. We see that either USA or E12 economies lose their positions in the post-war period: 
their competitiveness is smaller than competitiveness of all other countries/regions. The fit of 
the model (see Figure 14) is rather poor and is clearly unsatisfactory. Significant differences 
between the model and the historical data are seen in almost all countries/regions, but 
especially visible in a case of China, Japan, and the Rest of the World. This is caused by 
significant differences in the mood of development of the World economy before and after 
1980. It is clearly seen when we look at the dynamics of competitiveness in the post-war 
period (Figure 15). To identify the moving competiveness we use the 14 years identification 
window.
19
 It is clearly visible that in all competitiveness the mood of changes up to 1980 is 
significantly different than that after 1980. It is worth to notice that in the last three decades 
the competitiveness of India economy is only slightly smaller than the China competitiveness, 
and that the USA competitiveness, although smaller than Chinese and Indian, is significantly 
greater than that of E12. 
  
 
Figure 15. Dynamics of the competitiveness: USA, E12, Japan, China, India and the Rest of 
the World (identification is based on the 14 years moving window of historical data) 
 
Therefore let‟s look more closely on the development of the world economy in the last 
three decades. The average competitiveness in the period 1980-2006 are presented in Table 8, 
and we see that it confirm general impression flowing from Figure 15; Japan and E12 
economies lose their position, but USA economy tries to „straggle‟ with China and India. 
Figure 16 shows the prognosis based on the trends observed in the period 1980-2006. It 
confirms the suggestions concerning the expected future of Chinese economy presented in 
                                                 
18
 E12 consists of the twelve European countries, namely: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
19
 It is necessary to identify 2n-1 parameters in our model (n is the number of countries/regions; namely n-1 
competiveness and n initial shares), therefore the number of historical data ought to be greater then 2n-1 (in our 
case greater then 11, therefore we select 14 years identification window). 
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Figure 9 (the share of China GDP will be around 60% of the global GDP). According to that 
prediction, currently (in 2011) we ought to observe catching up of USA by Chinese economy 
(in GDP terms). India economy will exceed the E12 around 2030 and will be at the same level 
as USA in the middle of the 21
st
 century.  
 
Table 8. Values of the model’s parameters: USA, E12, Japan, China, India and the Rest of 
the World – the identification period 1980-2006 
 Competitiveness (ci) Initial share fi(t0) in 1949 
USA  1.005344  0.211215 
E12  0.994965  0.215214 
Japan  0.996753  0.086284 
China  1.049823  0.053095 
India  1.031486  0.030351 
Rest of the World 1.000000  0.403841 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Evolution of the GDP shares of the six regions/countries: USA, E12, Japan, 
China, India and the Rest of the World (the identification period 1980-2006) 
 
An idea of ranking the national economies according to their competitiveness index has 
come to us during the working on that paper. The problem is that if we would like to consider 
let‟s say 100 nations and calculate their competitiveness using our model we ought to have 
historical data on their GDP for roughly 200 years. Naturally it is not possible to collect such 
long historical data; therefore we propose a simplified approach. Let‟s assume that we 
consider each country separately as competing with the Rest of the World. To identify the 
competitiveness of that country (against the competiveness of the Rest, all time assumed as 
equal to one
20
) we ought to have historical data on at least four years (usually we assume 
longer period, e.g. 7 years for two types (countries)). Just to enquire the relevance of that 
approach we calculated moving competiveness for the five considered countries/regions by 
making five simulation experiments: each country compete with the rest of the World. The 
results of those experiments are presented in Figure 17. The general tendency of the 
                                                 
20
 as we explain in (Kwasnicki, Kwasnicka, 1996) one country (type) ought to be treated as the reference country 
(type) and it is necessary to assume the reference value of the competitiveness of that country (type). 
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competiveness changes is more or less similar to that observed in the experiment where all 
countries/nations competed altogether (see Figure 15). Just to show the level of the 
differences, the Figures 15 and 17 are collectively presented in Figure 18 (for all six 
countries/regions competing (solid lines) and calculated separately for each country 
competing with the Rest of The World (dashed lines)). The differences are clearly visible 
although there is general agreement concerning observed tendencies and far reaching 
similarities in the competitiveness rankings. In Table 9 the rankings of these five 
countries/regions for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 are presented. The compatibility 
of rankings obtained for those two approaches is astonishingly good. The only difference is 
for the year 1970 where USA and E12 interchange their positions (but as we see in Figure 33 
their competitiveness are very similar).  
 
 
Figure 17. Dynamics of the competitiveness: USA, E12, Japan, China, India and the Rest 
of the World, calculated separately for each country competing with the Rest of The World 
(identification is based on the 14 years moving window of historical data) 
 
 
Table 9. Rankings of competitiveness of different countries/regions for two approaches 
‘altogether competition’ and ‘separate competition’  
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
altogether 
competition 
separate 
competition 
altogether 
competition 
separate 
competition 
altogether 
competition 
separate 
competition 
altogether 
competition 
separate 
competition 
USA 3 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 
E12 2 3 4 4 5 5 4 4 
Japan 1 1 1 1 3 3 4 4 
China 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
India 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 
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Figure 18. Comparison of the dynamics of the competitiveness: USA, E12, Japan, China, 
India and the Rest of the World, for all six countries/regions competing (solid lines) and 
calculated separately for each country competing with the Rest of The World (dashed lines); 
(identification is based on the 14 years moving window of historical data) 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Dynamics of the competitiveness of nine countries and E12; calculated separately 
for each country competing with the Rest of The World (identification is based on the 7 years 
moving window of historical data) 
 
There is no place present the rankings of competitiveness of all countries in the World but 
we plan to endeavour such project in near future. Here, as the first step toward that project we 
present the experiment for twenty nine selected countries and E12 (distinguished as a region 
competing especially with USA and China). Dynamics of the competitiveness of ten selected 
countries are presented in Figure 19 (for larger number of countries the figure would be 
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unreadable). Once more we see great variability of the competitiveness for almost all 
countries since the middle of the 20
th
 century. In Table 15 we present the rankings of those 30 
countries/region for selected years. We start from the middle 1950s, and as we see Israel, 
Germany and Japan were the most competitive countries at that time. Due to the market 
oriented reforms initiated in 1948 by Ludwig Erhard the German economy was one of the 
most competitive in the 1950s, but in a course of time Germany become more and more 
welfare state and became less and less competitive, in 1980 was ranked 19
th
, in 1990 25
th
, and 
in the last years was placed in the bottom of ranking. The same tendency of losing the 
competitiveness is observed for whole twelve European countries (E12). Growing 
competitiveness in the last 20-30 years is observed for such economies as: Chile, Ireland, 
India, and China. Poland, and to some extend also Hungary, are good examples of 
competitiveness advance due to the market oriented transformations. In 1990 these two 
counters was at the bottom of the ranking and now, after 20 years of transformation are placed 
in the top ten positions. 
In the last column of the Table 15 the competitiveness indices for the last available 
historical data (2006) are presented. It is worth to notice high superiority of China and India 
over all advanced economies. The index for China is roughly 10% higher than these of USA, 
France, Japan and Germany. Even small differences in the values of the competitive indices 
result in enormous advantage/disadvantage of the economy in the long perspectives. For 
example nearly 3% difference between competitiveness of China and the West in period 
1950-2006 (see Table 5) resulted in increase of China‟s share in global GDP from 11% in 
2000 to 28% in 2050 and decrease of the share of the West from 44% to 29% (see Figure 10). 
 
Table 10. Ranking of the competiveness of selected economies (30 countries and 
regions) 
 
ranking 1956 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2006 2006 
1 Israel Israel Singapore Hong Kong South Korea China Ireland China 1.0707 
2 Germany Japan Japan South Korea Hong Kong Singapore India India 1.0291 
3 Japan Hong Kong South Korea Singapore Singapore Chile Singapore Ireland 1.0098 
4 South Korea Brazil Israel Brazil China South Korea Poland Hong Kong 1.0053 
5 Hong Kong Germany Spain Mexico Chile Israel China Singapore 1.0029 
6 China Mexico Brazil China India Hong Kong Finland South Korea 1.0015 
7 Austria Austria Mexico Chile Japan India Chile Chile 1.0011 
8 Italy China Hong Kong Ireland Spain Ireland South Korea Hungary 0.9992 
9 Singapore Italy Italy Norway Ireland Norway Israel Poland 0.9927 
10 Mexico France Australia Japan Israel Australia Netherlands Spain 0.9893 
11 Spain E12 Netherlands India Australia N. Zealand Australia N. Zealand 0.9893 
12 Netherlands Poland France Italy Finland Mexico USA Australia 0.9881 
13 Brazil Hungary Canada USA UK USA Mexico Israel 0.9860 
14 E12 Canada Austria Canada USA Austria Canada Sweden 0.9853 
15 Canada South Korea Ireland Israel Canada Netherlands Spain Finland 0.9847 
16 Switzerland Finland China Spain France Brazil Hungary Canada 0.9830 
17 Finland Australia Finland Australia Italy Denmark Norway UK 0.9808 
18 Poland Singapore Chile Austria Brazil Japan Sweden Brazil 0.9799 
19 N. Zealand Switzerland Poland Germany Netherlands Spain UK Norway 0.9793 
20 France Denmark Norway France Austria Germany Denmark Mexico 0.9790 
21 Norway N. Zealand E12 Netherlands Switzerland Canada Hong Kong USA 0.9777 
22 India Chile Denmark E12 E12 UK Austria Austria 0.9742 
23 Australia India Switzerland Finland Sweden France N. Zealand Denmark 0.9733 
24 Hungary Netherlands Sweden Denmark Norway E12 France France 0.9730 
25 USA Spain Germany Hungary Germany Italy Brazil Switzerland 0.9719 
26 Chile Norway India UK Denmark Poland E12 Netherlands 0.9707 
27 Sweden Sweden USA Poland Mexico Switzerland Italy Japan 0.9707 
28 UK USA Hungary Sweden N. Zealand Sweden Switzerland E12 0.9670 
29 Denmark UK UK Switzerland Hungary Finland Germany Italy 0.9648 
30 Ireland Ireland N. Zealand N. Zealand Poland Hungary Japan Germany 0.9638 
 
Possible scenario of development 
The extrapolation of future development of structure of the global GDP as presented in Figure 
16 seems to be improbable, mainly because it is hardly possible that the competitiveness of 
distinguished six countries/regions will be constant in the next 40 years. Let‟s make an 
experiment and assume future development of competitiveness of the six regions. The initial 
24 
 
competiveness of those six regions are as presented in Table 8 (i.e., based on the identification 
period 1980-2006). Future competitiveness (up to 2050) is assumed to changes as follows 
(what is illustrated in Figure 20): US competitiveness will be stable (and equal to 1.005344) 
up to 2020 and since that year will growth steadily (in linear form) in the next 30 years, to 
reach 1.02 in 2050; the E12 competitiveness will remain constant (and equal to 0.994965) up 
to 2030, since that year it will growth steadily to reach 1.01 in 2050; the same pattern is 
assumed for Japan, although it is assumed that the reform will start earlier then in Europe, and 
the steady growth of Japanese economy competiveness will start in 2020, to reach the same 
value 1.01 in 2050; Chinese economy competitiveness will be the highest one (and equal to 
1.49823) up to 2015, and next  will drop heavily to reach 1.0 in 2030, since that year became 
stable and equal 1.0 (so it is assumed that the pattern is similar to that of Japan in 1970s and 
1980s); India competitiveness will growth from the initial 1.031486 to 1.04 in 2025 and since 
that year will diminish steadily to 1.01 in 2050; the competitiveness of the Rest of the Worlds, 
as the reference competitiveness is assumed to be constant for the whole period, and equal to 
1.0.  
 
Figure 20. Assumed evolution of the competiveness of the six countries/regions in the 
proposed scenario 
In short we assume that US economy will be able to revive in the next ten years and will 
return to its relatively high competitiveness after 2020, the European countries (mainly due to 
bureaucratic burden of EU) will start necessary reforms ten years later, and will slowly revive 
after 2030, Japan will follow the same pattern of reforms as US, although their results will be 
not so impressive (therefore the end competitiveness in 2050 of Japan is slightly smaller than 
US in 2050); China will be able to be the most competitive economy in the next decade, but 
mainly due to the lack of the political reform the economy will lose its vigorousness after 
2020; thanks to the democratic system and openness of Indian economy the India will became 
the most competitive economy since 2019 to 2044.  
In Figure 21 the evolution of the structure of the global GDP (under the above 
assumptions) is presented. The Chinese economy overcome the US in 2011 (with roughly 
20% shares of global GDP by both economies) and will still growth to reach the maximum 
share equal to 28% in 2027, in the next two decades (still being the largest global economy) 
its share is dropping to reach 24.5% in 2050. The second largest economy will be US, but its 
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share will still decline to reach the minimum 18.3% in 2027. Since that year the share US 
economy will rise to reach 22% in 2050 (roughly the same as China). The share of Indian 
economy will growth steadily to reach almost 16% in 2050 (and being the 3
rd
 Word 
economy). Total share of twelve European countries (E12) will keep the past tendency to 
decline, but, due to the reform initiated in 2030s, in middle of the century will reach a plateau 
with the share equal to 10%. The same pattern of development will experience Japan, but the 
plateau (roughly 5% share) is reached by Japanese economy in the beginning of 2030s. 
 
 
Figure 21. Scenario of development of future structure of the global GDP –  the six 
regions/countries: USA, E12, Japan, China, India and the Rest of the World 
 
Conclusions 
All roads lead to Rome. We have outlined and presented findings of different forecasts on 
future of global economy made by different teams, in different institutions and under different 
assumptions. Most of them treat the year 2050 as the reference horizon of the prognosis. We 
have presented also our prediction concerning the future structure of the global economy 
based on the evolutionary model. Naturally there are large differences between the forecasts 
especially when we go into details, but from some point of view there is one common 
conclusion of all future studies, namely that in the middle of the 21
st
 century the global 
economy will be dominated by three counties, namely USA, China and India. Additionally it 
can be said that the „old powers‟, Europe and Japan  are on the slippery slope. The center of 
economic activity are moving toward the east and probably in the end of the 21
st
 century will 
be placed somewhere in the middle of the North Pacific Ocean (within a triangle USA-China-
India). 
How to find our own way of development in this new shape of the World? It‟s great 
challenge to Poles and to Poland. In all reviewed forecasts Poland is hardly mentioned. What 
is the reason of that? What kind of conclusions we ought to draw from this phenomenon? We 
have made great economic progress in the last 22 years, to some extend we have opened new 
possibilities for further socio-economic development for many European and non-European 
societies. Why it is not noticed by the authors of these future studies?  
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Streszczenie 
 
W pierwszej części artykułu przestawiono przegląd prognoz globalnego rozwoju 
gospodarczego do 2050 roku (np. prognozy Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil z Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, raport HSBC, raport CitiGroup, raport 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, prognozy Banku Światowego i Międzynarodowego Funduszu 
Walutowego). W tym kontekście opisano różnorodne poglądy i opinie dotyczące przyszłego 
rozwoju gospodarczego Chin i Indii (uznawanych obecnie za najszybciej rozwijające się 
wielkie gospodarki na świecie). Cechą wspólną niemalże wszystkich opracowań odnośnie 
długofalowej przyszłości gospodarczej świata jest to, że ich autorzy dochodzą do wniosku, że 
gospodarki Chin i Indii zdominują gospodarkę globalną i w pierwszej połowie XXI wieku 
będą dwiema największymi gospodarkami na świecie. Pytanie na ile to przekonanie jest 
uzasadnione jest przedmiotem rozważań w drugiej części artykułu, gdzie przedstawiona 
zostanie ekstrapolacyjna prognoza rozwoju globalnego PKB i oszacowanie udziału 
gospodarek Chin i Indii w produkcji globalnej do roku 2050 na podstawie tzw. ewolucyjnego 
modelu konkurencji. 
Wykorzystany ewolucyjny model konkurencji umożliwia oszacowanie konkurencyjności 
gospodarek narodowych, dlatego w dalszej części artykułu przedstawiono wyniki badania 
konkurencyjności gospodarek Indii i Chin w okresie po drugiej wojnie światowej. Dokonano 
także porównania konkurencyjności Chin i Indii z liderami rozwoju gospodarczego w XX 
wieku, jakimi były Stany Zjednoczone, Wielka Brytania, Niemcy, Japonia oraz Unia 
Europejska.  Podsumowaniem tych rozważań są prawdopodobne (choć bardzo subiektywne) 
prognozy udziału PKB Chin i Indii w produkcie globalnym na podstawie scenariuszy zmian 
konkurencyjności tych gospodarek w następnych 40 latach.   
 
Słowa kluczowe: prognozowanie, studia nad przyszłością, globalizacja, rozwój gospodarczy. 
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Abstract 
 
In the first part of the paper an overview of the long-term global economic growth 
forecasts is presented (e.g., forecasts of Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, a report by HSBC, CitiGroup report, reports of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, or Goldman Sachs reports). In this context, the diversified views 
and opinions on future economic development of China and India (currently considered as the 
fastest-growing major economies in the world) are presented. In the second part of the article, 
an extrapolative forecast of global GDP and an estimation of the economies of China and 
India in global production by 2050 based on the so-called evolutionary model of competition 
is outlined. 
The evolutionary model of competition enables to estimate the competitiveness of national 
economies, therefore in the second part of the paper we presents also the results of estimation 
of the competitiveness of the economies of India and China after World War II. One aim of 
that research is to compare the competitiveness of China and India with the leaders of 
economic development in the twentieth century, namely the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, Japan and the European Union. The summary of these considerations are 
estimations the shares of GDP of China and India in the global product based on global 
scenarios of the competitiveness changes of these economies over the next 40 years. 
 
Key words: future studies, forecasting, globalization, economic growth. 
 
